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The Insanity Defense - A Perplexing
Problem of Criminal Justice
Dale E. Bennett*
A WORKABLE TEST OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
There is general agreement today, although the early law was
not so humanely disposed, that no criminal responsibility should
attach for harm committed as a result of true mental disease or
defect. Here, however, the agreement ends. No generally accept-
able test of criminal responsibility has been developed, either by
legislative enactment or judicial precedent. A legal formula,
capable of practical application in drawing the line between those
crimes resulting from mental defect and those resulting from
innate meanness, involves a balancing of sometimes incompatible
humanitarian, utilitarian, and scientific considerations. In eval-
uating or stating such a formula, two basic objectives must be
kept in mind. On the one hand, the insanity defense is to be
determined by a lay jury- for the insanity issue is a question
of fact relating to guilt or innocence.1 Therefore the test must
be simple enough that the average juror can understand and
apply it. At the same time, the test should be so phrased that it
is capable of application in the light of modern psychiatric knowl-
edge. A "stick our heads in the sand" attitude should not be
taken, ignoring the fact that there have been tremendous de-
velopments in psychiatry during the last twenty years.
Any discussion of the insanity defense begins, and frequently
ends, with a consideration of the "right and wrong" test of the
celebrated M'Naghten's case, decided by the House of Lords over
a hundred years ago.2 This rule is presently followed in much of
the British Commonwealth and in thirty American states.3 It is
interesting to note the disposition of this problem by the two
states which have most recently adopted comprehensive revisions
of their substantive criminal law. The 1942 Louisiana Criminal
Code expressly retained the basic M'Naghten test by providing
exemption from criminal responsibility where "the circumstances
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. State v. Lange, 168 La. 958, 123 So. 639 (1929).
2. 10 Clark & F. 200. 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843).
3. MODEL PENAL CODE 161-463 (Tentative Draft No. 4, April 1955).
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indicate that because of a mental disease or mental defect the
offender was incapable of distinguishing between right and
wrong with reference to the conduct in question. ' 4 The Wisconsin
Legislative Council's 1953 recommended Criminal Code codified
a similar "right and wrong" test.5 When the Wisconsin Crim-
inal Code was adopted in 1955, it contained no definition of
insanity, with the result that the issue will still be determined
in that state by the "right and wrong" test under its existing
jurisprudence.0 "Dissatisfaction with the M'Naghten's rules is
widespread among American psychiatrists," and it has been
variously characterized as a crystallization of "antiquated, out-
worn, archaic ways of thinking," and as a "hangover ... from
theological and moral ideas that have survived their period of
usefulness. in this twentieth century civilization."'7 One very
prominent psychiatrist flatly declares that "knowledge of right
and wrong is a problem for the theologist and not for a phy-
sician.""
The obvious question is why Louisiana and Wisconsin, with
their modern and carefully drafted criminal codes, have not dis-
carded the "right and wrong" test? Both states have abolished
such common law anachronisms as the artificial distinctions be-
tween the stealing crimes, and the misleading "malice afore-
thought" concept in murder, yet they have not provided a mod-
ern scientific insanity test. In this regard it is well to note that
there has been much criticism, but scant constructive help from
the writings of the psychiatrists. Most psychiatrists condemn
the right and wrong test, but there is no general agreement as to
what the proper test should be. Many psychiatrists and psy-
chologists prefer an elastic rule that would put no limitation
upon psychiatric testimony - and, at the same time, would pro-
vide little or no guide for jury decision. When they become more
specific, each school of thinking suggests its own ultra-technical
4. LA. R.S. 14:14 (1950), originally enacted as La. Acts 1942, No. 43.
5. REPORT OF WISCONSIN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL OF PROPOSED CRIMINAL CODE
§ 339.41 (1953). The accompanying note states that the insanity test "is a re-
statement of the old law in Wisconsin, a succinct statement of which miy be found
in the case of Simeeek v. State, 243 Wis. 439 (1943) at page 448."
6. Ibid.
7. Quotations from WHITE, TWENTIETH CENTURY PSYCHIATRY 110 (1936),
collected in HALL, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 481 (1947).
8. The general dissatisfaction with the M'Naghten rule is clearly shown in a
report by Manfred S. Guttmacher, M.D., in connection with MODEL PENAL CODE
170, 173 (Tentative Draft No. 4, April 1955).
9. LA. R.S. 14:67 (theft), 30 (murder) (1950) WIS. CRIM. CODE § 343.20
(stealing), § 340.01 (first degree murder) (1955).
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standard.10 As we approach the baffling problem of defining
criminal insanity, we realize the perspicuity of Justice Moise's
statement in the Masino case." The case involved the effect of
a restrictive bill of particulars. The Supreme Court's decision
was eminently sound, but any explanation was sure to prove
somewhat satisfactory. In announcing the rule of the case,
Justice Moise aptly concluded, "It is easier to find fault with a
remedy proposed than to propose a remedy that is faultless."'
11
Let us consider, then, the other remedies most frequently pro-
posed. The "product" test, which was first announced by a New
Hampshire case in 1871, 3 was given recent impetus by a de-
cision of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in
Durham v. United States.1 4 The Durham case "product" test has
given rise to a flood of law review comments, pro and con,' 5 and
is rejoiced in by eminent psychiatrists. 6 It establishes a very
simple test - was the criminal act "the product of mental dis-
ease or defect?" It is interesting to note that a similar test, con-
versely stated, was proposed in the original tentative draft of
the insanity article of the Louisiana Criminal Code. This article
stated, "If the circumstances indicate that a mental disease or a
mental defect is the direct cause of the commission of the crime,
the offender shall be exempt from criminal responsibility.' 7 The
proposal was almost unanimously rejected by an able advisory
committee composed of judges, prosecuting attorneys, and ex-
perienced criminal lawyers, and the writer concurred in that
decision. The test was believed to be too general - providing
very little guidance for the jury. The existing "right and wrong"
test, though having admitted inadequacies, did provide a meas-
uring stick against which the conflicting testimony of the psy-
10. HALL, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 483-85 (1947).
11. State v. Masino, 214 La. 744, 38 So.2d 622 (1949).
12. Id. at 748, 38 So.2d at 623.
13. State v. Jones, 50 N.H. 369 (1871), wherein Justice Ladd declared that
it was for the jury to determine "whether the killing was the product of mental
disease."
14. 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
15. One excellent collection of such comments: Insanity and the Criminal Law
- A Critique of Durham v. United States, 22 U. CHI. L. REv. 317-404 (1955).
16. Id. at 325, Dr. Manfred S. Guttmacher declares, "The voice of American
psychiatry is certain to be raised in praise of the decision in Durham v. United
States." Dr. Gregory Zilboorg, id. at 331, happily states, "One cannot help but
feel that this historic decision is bound to become a point of departure for many
an enlightened and creative decision on the part of both judges and juries who
heretofore were manacled by a strange leftover of ancient prejudice couched in
legalistic terms and meaning so little."




chiatrists could be evaluated. It provided something tangible
that the average juror could understand. The English Royal
Commission's report in September 1953 carried the idea of the
"product" test even further. A majority, but not unanimous,
recommendation by the Commission would simply leave the jury
"to determine whether at the time of the act the accused was
suffering from disease of the mind [or mental deficiency] to
such a degree that he ought not to be held responsible." ' This
formula virtually leaves the question of criminal responsibility
up to the inherent sense of justice of the jury, providing it with
even less guidance than the "product" test.
The so-called "irresistible impulse" test, which has been
adopted by several states either by statute or jurisprudence,1 9
is an extension of the "right and wrong" test. Even though the
defendant realized the wrongness of his act, he is not responsible
if, "by reason of mental disease or defect," he was "irresistibly
impelled" to do the act. The basis of a general judicial fear of
the test is expressed in a 1947 Washington decision where the
court declared: "For myself I can not see how a person who ra-
tionally comprehends the nature and quality of an act, and knows
that it is wrong and criminal, can act through irresistible inno-
cent impulse. Knowing the nature of the act well enough to make
him otherwise liable for it under the law, can we say that he acts
from irresistible impulse and not criminal design and guilt?...
How can knowledge of the nature and wrongness of the act exist
along with such impulse as shall exonerate him ?' 20 The same
thought was aptly expressed in an English case, Rex v. True,
where the court pointed out that men's minds are not divided into
separate compartments and if a man's will power was destroyed
by a mental defect it might well be that the disease would so af-
fect his mental powers as to destroy his power of knowing what
he was doing, or of knowing that it was wrong.21 Another English
jurist referred to "impulsive insanity" as "the last refuge of a
hopeless defense." 22
18. ROYAL COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1.949-1.953 REPORT, recom-
mendation iii, at 116.
19. The defense is recognized in federal jurisdiction, United States Army, and
fourteen states. MODEL PENAL CODE 161 (Tentative Draft No. 4, April 1955). For
a recent application of the test, see State v. White, 270 P.2d 727, 737 (N.M. 1954).
20. State v. Maish, 29 Wash.2d 52, 185 P.2d 486 (1947), quoting from the
leading West Virginia case of State v. Harrison, 36 W.Va. 729, 15 S.E. 982 (1892).
21. 16 Crim. App. Rep. 164, 167, 127 L.T. 561, 27 Cox C.C. 287 (1922).
22. Darling, J., in Rex v. Wright, 7 Crim. App. Rep. 52 (1911).
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Looking at the problem from a purely practical point of view,
it is a dangerous doctrine to recognize a special defense that "I
knew the act was wrong, but just couldn't resist the killing or
the rape." The query immediately arises - was it that he could
not or just did not resist? A Canadian court highlights this ap-
proach when it states, "The law says to the men who say they
are afflicted with irresistible impluse, 'If you cannot resist an
impulse in any other way, we will hang a rope in front of your
eyes, and perhaps that will help.' ",23
In a last analysis, the so-called "irresistible impulse" test has
not received the whole-hearted approbation of any group. It is
inadequate from the standpoint of the defense, since it is implied-
ly restricted to sudden and impulsive acts. It does not cover
insane acts resulting from brooding and reflection. In a 1951
questionnaire addressed by Dr. Manfred S. Guttmacher to mem-
bers of the American Psychiatric Association, one of the ques-
tions asked was, "Do you believe the concept of the irresistible
impulse is psychiatrically and legally sound ?" Of the 350 replies,
sixty percent were in the negative. In analyzing this phase of
his questionnaire, Dr. Guttmacher explains, "The problem is not
primarily whether there are impulses and unconscious drives
that overwhelm some mentally disordered individuals. Most psy-
chiatrists would readily agree that they exist .... The real diffi-
culty is to draw the nice line between those who can and those
who cannot resist them. I am less pessimistic than many about
our ability to be of help in this, but the task is exceedingly diffi-
cult and the percentage of error must admittedly be high. I do
not myself feel that tinkering with the right and wrong rule in
this way would be the answer. '24
One of the most learned and vigorous opponents of the "ir-
resistible impulse" test is Professor Jerome Hall, who maintains
that in a real case of an irresistible killing the defense can mar-
shal psychiatric testimony to prove that the offender was unable
to comprehend the wrongness of his act at the time. The present
tendency, according to Hall, is to interpret the M'Naghten rules
"more soundly in reliance upon such valid psychiatry as has been
available. ' 25 Assuming the general validity of this last state-
23. Rex v. Creighton, 14 Can. Crim. Cas. 349 (1908).
24. Memorandum submitted in connection with the American Law Institute's
tentative draft of an insanity test. MODEL PENAL CODE 170, 174 (Tentative Draft
No. 4, April 1955).
25. HIALL, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 511 (1947).
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ment, prominent and practical psychiatrists point out .that there
are frequent cases of real insanity where the psychiatric evidence
cannot be logically channeled into the "right and wrong" test. Dr.
Guttmacher, in a memorandum submitted in connection with
the American Law Institute's consideration of the insanity issue,
submits an actual case which could not be adequately handled
under the traditional "right and wrong" test. A bright young
soldier "became morbidly unhappy under frustrations imposed
upon him while on maneuvers in Texas. He appealed to the chap-
lain because of his overpowering desire to kill some officer. He
was referred to the divisional psychiatrist and had four inter-
views with him. He then fashioned a missile out of a blank and
at four inches distance shot a lieutenant attached to his company,
whom he did not know. Two M.P.s were within a few yards of
him. He immediately threw his weapon down and stood at pa-
rade rest." He had killed his officer. Certainly the young soldier
knew the wrongness of his action. He was found not to have been
under the domination of an irresistible impulse "because the
Army Manual says that the neurotic pattern should be repetitive
and they are uncertain about his having had previous instances
of an irresistible impulse. '26
A similar non-conforming mental condition was presented in
the pitiful New York case of People v. Sherwood,27 where a
mother was charged with murder as a result of the intentional
drowning of her two-year old infant son. The defendant's life
history presented a sad story of continued frustrations for a girl
whose mother died when she was nine years of age and who
served until she was sixteen as household drudge for her itiner-
ant father and his successive wives. Her subsequent life as a
chorus girl with traveling companies was equally insecure and
discouraging. What might have been a happy, though modest,
marriage ended in sadness when the husband and father of the
infant son died of tuberculosis. After a period of hand to mouth
existence as a waitress, fortune seemed to smile when a man
offered to marry her and provide a home for her son. Came the
26. Memorandum submitted in connection with the American Law Institute's
tentative draft of an insanity test, by Guttmacher. MODEL PENAL CODE 175
(Tentative Draft No. 4, April 1955).
27. 271 N.Y. 427, 3 N.E.2d 581 (1936). Conviction of first degree murder re-
versed because of erroneous instructions to the jury. During the second trial Mrs.
Sherwood pleaded guilty to manslaughter and was'given an indeterminate sentence
of six to fifteen years. After serving three years, she was released on parole. See
HALL & GLUECK, CASES ON CRIMINAL LAW AND ENFORCEMENT 331, n. 4 (1951).
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wedding day, but not the bridegroom. Defendant had given up
her job, was subsequently evicted from her home, and her whole
life seemed to collapse around her. In a befuddled mental state
she carried her baby boy three and a half miles to a secluded spot
where she allowed him to wade in a shallow brook until he tired.
Theit she held him under the water until he was drowned, dressed
him in clean clothing she had brought along and carried him in
her arms to the police station. There she reported that she had
drowned him, with the laconic statement. "I couldn't take care of
him any longer and I thought he would be better off dead."
Again, as in the case of the frustrated soldier, the homicide had
resulted from a mental crack-up, but the defendant realized the
nature and wrongness of the act. Also, the circumstances nega-
tived any idea that the killing had resulted from a spontaneous
and irresistible insane impulse.
The baffling problem raised by the multiple forms and mani-
festations of mental disease and defect in criminal cases has
been recently considered at length by the American Law Insti-
tute in connection with the drafting of a Model Penal Code. The
policies in this Code are considered, evaluated, and guided by
an advisory committee which is specially qualified to view the
problem from all of its sometimes contradictory practical, theo-
retical, scientific, and philosophical aspects. It is composed of
prominent federal and state jurists, men experienced in the en-
forcement and administration of criminal law, criminal lawyers,
prominent psychiatrists and psychologists, and law professors
who specialize in the criminal law field.2 8 Professor Herbert
Weschler, Chief Reporter for the Institute, hit the key note of
the work when he declared that rethinking of this important
insanity question "means going to the fundamentals." A review
of Weschler's comment accompanying the tentative draft of the
insanity test 29 indicates that it is posited upon certain funda-
mental conclusions. The "right and wrong" test is inadequate
today from the standpoints of both science and practicality.
However, the correct avenue of reform is not the addition of an
"irresistible impulse" alternative; nor is it the formulation of
such nebulous criteria as the "product" test of the Durham case
or the "sense of justice" test embodied in the Royal Commission
28. For a full list of the Advisory Committee, see MODEL PENAL CODE, V
(Tentative Draft No. 4, April 1955).




proposal. The American Law Institute draft avoids the some-
times arbitrary limitations of the "right and wrong" test, so as
to permit the jury's consideration of all relevant psychiatric
testimony. At the same time, it provides a tangible and under-
standable criteria for jury determination of criminal responsi-
bility. The Model Code rule, prepared by Weschler, favorably
considered by the Advisory Committee, and tentatively approved
by the American Law Institute in May 1955, reads as follows:
"§ 4.01 Mental Disease or Defect Excluding Responsibility
"(1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if
at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or
defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the
criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the
requirements of law.
"(2) The terms 'mental disease or defect' do not include
an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or
otherwise anti-social conduct."
Two significant matters should be noted concerning the
American Law Institute test. First, it meets the dual purposes
of a workable definition of insanity. It provides a broad base,
so that all relevant psychiatric testimony may be brought in.
Yet, it is stated in language that the average lay juror can under-
stand. It provides a tangible yardstick against which scientific
testimony can be measured. Further, clause (2) will serve to
prevent abuse of the broadened insanity definition by excluding
the so-called "psychopathic personality" from the concept of
criminally insane. It is in keeping with the wise admonition that
we should "keep the expert on tap, but not on top." 0
INSANITY PROCEDURES
Equally important, but somewhat more susceptible of a gen-
erally agreeable solution, are the procedures for administering
the insanity defense. Most states follow the rule that the de-
fense of insanity at the time of the crime, like any other defense
going to the basic issue of criminal liability, can be raised under
30. HALL, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 538 (1947). While the proposed rule
goes beyond the "right and wrong" rule that Professor Hall has so eloquently
defended, it is free from many of the objections which he and other writers have
leveled at the "irresistible impulse" test. Further, it provides a tangible jury guide
that is not found in the "product" test.
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a general "not guilty" plea. A number of states require that
the defense of mental irresponsibility be specially pleaded, and
some of these further require that it be separately tried. Provi-
sions for separate trial of the insanity defense are aimed at
avoiding prejudicial confusion of insanity evidence and other
sometimes contradictory claims, such as self-defense. They have,
however, fallen short of that laudable objective. Where the in-
sanity issue is tried first, as originally provided in the Louisiana
1928 Code of Criminal Procedure,81 the result has been most
unsatisfactory. If separate juries are impaneled, considerable
delay and added expense results. Even more significant is the
difficulty of securing an extra twelve-man jury in a small parish
with limited jury lists. If a single jury hears the insanity evi-
dence and then subsequently passes upon the other basic guilt
issues, the contemplated advantage of the bifurcated trial is
largely defeated. As a result of such difficulties, Louisiana soon
amended its insanity trial procedures so as to delete the provi-
sion calling for a prior trial of the insanity issue. 32 Under pres-
ent somewhat confusingly stated procedures a special insanity
plea is required if insanity is to be urged as a defense,83 but
when the omnibus plea of "not guilty by reason of insanity"84
is filed, the insanity issue is tried along with the other guilt
issues8 5 - thus nullifying the split-trial treatment intended by
the 1928 Code of Criminal Procedure.
The California bifurcated trial procedure appears to be most
nearly adapted to the use of a single jury, without a prejudicial
confusion of the insanity evidence and the other basic guilt
issues. The basic guilt issues are tried first. If the defendant is
found otherwise guilty of the crime he is next separately tried,
by the same jury, on his insanity plea.8 6 While this procedure
has proved reasonably workable, it has not resulted in as com-
plete an actual isolation of the insanity evidence as had been
hoped for. It is still possible to get such evidence before the
jury under the theory that it has a bearing on the intent element
of the crime. Also, it is arguable that a rigid separation of
31. LA. CODE OF CRIM. PROC. art. 267 (1928).
32. La. Acts 1932, No. 136, p. 449.
33. State v. Gunter, 208 La. 694, 23 So.2d 305 (1945).
34. The procedure in some parishes is to file dual pleas of "insanity at the time
of the crime" and "not guilty."
35. State v. Dowdy, 217 La. 773, 47 So.2d 496 (1950), discussed in The Work
of the Louisiana Supreme Couirt for the 1949-1950 Term - Criminal Procedure,
11 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 246 (1951).
36. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1026 (Deering 1937).
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the insanity evidence, from other evidence as to guilt or inno-
cence, serves no significant purpose.
Probably one of the greatest abuses of the insanity defense is
the surprise defense which is raised for the first time during the
trial, frequently catching the state by surprise and necessitating
a continuance of the trial until the next term of court. An in-
creasing number of states are meeting this problem by requiring
prior notice of the intention to rely on insanity as a defense.8 7 In
addition, several states achieve the same result by requiring that
insanity must be specially pleaded if it is to be urged as a de-
fense.38 The tentatively approved draft of the American Law
Institute's Model Penal Code includes a very sound provision,
which will curb dilatory tactics without unduly hampering a
valid insanity defense. Section 4.03 provides that:
"(2) Evidence of mental disease or defect excluding re-
sponsibility shall not be admissible unless the defendant at
the time of entering his plea of not guilty or within ten days
thereafter or at such later time as the Court may for good
cause permit files a written notice of his purpose to rely on
such defense." 39
The composition of the lunacy commission, which examines
the accused as to his mental condition at the time of the crime,
is another matter upon which the law of some states is inade-
quate. A 1944 Louisiana statute,40 for example, simply provides
that the commission shall be composed of a disinterested phy-
sician whose sole qualification is that he has practiced medicine
for three years, and of the coroner whose inclusion has added
little to the prestige or capability of the commission. As a result
the lunacy commission's report is sometimes entitled to very
little weight and the "battle of experts" rages unabated. 41 The
Louisiana statute was not prompted by a failure to appreciate
the value of the testimony of trained psychiatrists, but rather
37. ARIz. CODE ANN. § 44-1031 (1939); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 909.17 (1943);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 777.18 (1949) ; MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 768.20, 768.21 (1948);
ORE. REV. STAT. § 135.870 (1953); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-22-16 (1953).
38. This is the present law in Louisiana under the holding in State v. Gunter,
208 La. 694, 23 So.2d 305 (1945).
39. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.03 (2) (Tentative Draft No. 4, April 1955) ; accord,
MODEL CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 235 (1930).
40. LA. R.S. 15:269 (1950), originally enacted as La. Acts 1944, No. 261,
p. 765.
41. It is encouraging to note that psychiatrists from the state mental hospital
frequently serve on lunacy commissions in Louisiana.
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by the heavy costs to the parish police juries of obtaining such
professional services. A sound solution to the problem is found
in the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code 42 and in the
Massachusetts Briggs law. 43 These provide for a lunacy com-
mission of trained psychiatrists, who are specialists in the char-
acteristics of the criminal insane, and who may be requested
from the state mental institution. The provision for requesting
a trained psychiatrist from the state mental institution is most
significant. It avoids the financial problem of the small par-
ishes, which was inherent in Louisiana's original provision. It
also insures a report by a competent psychiatrist who would be
completely free from either prosecution or defense influence. It
would probably necessitate the addition of one or two psychia-
trists to the presently overworked staff of the state mental hos-
pital, but that would be money well spent. Practical and promi-
nent scholars have commended the practicability of the Massa-
chusetts procedure in no uncertain terms. Professor Orfield, in
his book on criminal procedure, 44 declares that the Briggs law
"almost entirely eliminates the battle of experts," and cites Dr.
Overholser for the statement that "the Briggs law represents
the most significant step yet found towards a harmonious union
of psychiatry with the criminal law." The writer would like to
add a modest observation that one of the soundest moves that
can be made in securing an adequate jury appreciation of the
confusing insanity issue is to provide a lunacy commission report
which the jury will respect-a report that will stand forth as
an unbiased and competent analysis of the mental condition of
the accused.
An important related problem is the scope of the lunacy com-
mission's examination where the question of present insanity,
as a bar to immediate trial, is raised. In such a situation the
conmission's report covers only the present mental condition of
the defendant. 45 Where the defendant is found to be presently
incapable of standing trial, he is committed to a mental institu-
tion. When he subsequently recovers his mental powers, the
accused is released from the mental institution and brought to
trial for his alleged crime. If insanity at the time of the crime
is then pleaded as a defense, a separate lunacy examination and
42. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.05(1) (Tentative Draft No. 4, April 1955).
43. MAss. LAws ANN. c. 123, §§ 99, 100, 100A (1949).
44. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 281 (1947).
45. LA. R.S. 15:267 (1950).
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report is necessary. 46 The delayed second examination may be
seriously hampered by the fact that the evidence will be sketchy
and unreliable, especially if the accused has been held in the
mental institution for a considerable period of time. This dif-
ficulty is avoided in the American Law Institute's Model Penal
Code by providing for a single lunacy commission which may
be directed to file a combination report with respect to (1) the
effect of mental disease or defect on basic criminal responsibility,
and (2) the fitness of accused to proceed with the trial.47
The disposition of a defendant who is acquitted by reason
of insanity poses a problem where legislators have experienced
great difficulty in synchronizing humanitarian considerations
with practical justice and expediency. The laws of most states,
including Louisiana, 48 provide that the district judge, after
contradictory hearing, may commit the defendant to the state
mental institution. The committed person, however, is subject
to possible subsequent discharge upon order of court after the
institution reports that he is no longer dangerous. The possible
result of such an arrangement is shown by a 1945 Ohio case.49
The defendant, acquitted of first degree murder on the ground
of insanity, had been committed to the state mental hospital.
Shortly thereafter he was released from the mental institution
on the theory that he was not insane. In approving the discharge,
the Ohio Court of Appeals indicated that the accused was weak-
minded, but not crazy, and that the jury had probably made a
mistake in acquitting him on the ground of insanity. As a result,
he was turned loose. 50 This has been characterized as a "hunting
license to commit murder." Such a result scarcely provides ade-
quate protection for the public. In this regard, Professor Perkins
suggests, "The English procedure is much to be preferred. Under
the practice there one acquitted on the ground of insanity is
confined in a mental institution 'during the king's pleasure.'
And it has so seldom 'pleased' the king to release one so com-
mitted that this defense is rarely used." 51
46. Id. 15:268.
47. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.05 (Tentative Draft No. 4, April 1955).
48. Governed in Louisiana by the Mental Health Law, LA. R.S. 28:59, 96
(1950).
49. Yankulov v. Bushong, 88 Ohio App. 497, 77 N.E.2d 88 (1945).
50. It is interesting to note that the defendant was subsequently tried and
convicted of the armed robbery incidental to which the homicide had occurred.
51. Rollin M. Perkins, unpublished notes on criminal law and procedure.
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Again, the American Law Institute's tentative draft of a
Model Penal Code points the way to a very sound solution.52 It
provides for automatic commitment of a defendant who is ac-
quitted on the ground of insanity. Release is to be ordered upon
a clear finding by the court after a complete psychiatric ex-
amination and report that the person is no longer dangerous.
Further safeguards are provided through continued probation
and supervision. In approaching this problem it is well to re-
member that we are dealing with an offender who has been
acquitted of a serious crime because it resulted from insane, or
even maniacal, tendencies. Certainly it is not unfair to start
with a presumption that the acquitted offender is still dangerous
and to provide continuing safeguards for the public if he is later
released.
It has been the purpose of this article to raise a number of
problems concerning the insanity defense and the procedures
for its handling. While there may be differences of opinion as
to the suggested solutions, there should be general agreement
that here is an area of the law, where a careful re-appraisal of
basic principles and procedures is in order. In this regard the
American Law Institute's Model Penal Code and the procedures
presently in effect in Massachusetts and California have much to
offer.
52. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.08 (Tentative Draft No. 4, April 1955).
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